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1 
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES:  THE 
LINKS BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND 
THE SUPREME COURT’S 2011 TERM 
Peter J. Woolley* & Bruce G. Peabody** 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, scholars have begun to explore the role 
private citizens play in shaping constitutional law.  Some of these research 
efforts engage normative questions, while others construct descriptive, 
historical, and positive accounts of this phenomenon.1  Despite this 
increased interest in “popular constitutionalism,” few have sought to 
identify and measure the precise form and political impact of this variant of 
extrajudicial constitutional interpretation.  Stated differently, not much 
empirical work has defined popular constitutionalism’s specific content and 
parameters. 
 
*  Peter J. Woolley, Professor of Comparative Politics, Fairleigh Dickinson University.  
Professor Woolley is also co-founder and executive director (2001–2012) of PublicMind, 
Fairleigh Dickinson University’s independent survey research group. 
**  Bruce Peabody, Professor of Political Science, Fairleigh Dickinson University. 
 1. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (1996) (examining the 
role of various actors in interpreting the Constitution in the context of the abortion debate); 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009) (examining the 
impact of public opinion on constitutional change); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (positing that 
customary constitutionalism is only achieved when the Constitution reflects the will of the 
people); RICHARD D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST 
MANIFESTO (1994) (examining the flaws of anti-populist decision making); MARK TUSHNET, 
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing against constitutional 
judicial review); Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:  
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719 (2006) (examining some of the 
obstacles for popular constitutionalism in light of the rule of recognition (i.e., the rule for 
identifying law that is accepted as the ultimate rule by officials in the legal system)); Larry 
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?  Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 
(2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, 
Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006) (arguing that 
social movements influence constitutional understanding); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some 
Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002) (observing that popular constitutional movements have 
helped advance racial equality and gay rights); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret?  The 
Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986) (examining who 
should be the ultimate constitutional interpreter). 
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We attempt to address some of this deficiency in this essay (and in other 
work) by measuring and marking the constitutional attitudes of members of 
the public through scientific surveys.  We use the shorthand “constitutional 
thinking” to denote our interest in obtaining measurements of the public’s 
views on constitutional issues, especially in contexts where the public is 
likely to articulate a distinctive voice, rather than simply mimicking the 
pronouncements of courts and judges. 
Over the Supreme Court’s past two terms, the Fairleigh Dickinson 
University poll, PublicMind, has asked voters their legal opinions about 
cases being heard by the high court, testing the proposition that members of 
the public not only can be, but actually are, capable constitutional thinkers.  
This national polling has provided unique measures of public opinion on a 
number of substantive constitutional matters before the Court.  These 
issues, while notable to scholars and the most attentive Court watchers, 
were neither familiar to the public nor widely discussed in popular media. 
Indeed, while polling has provided snapshots and trend lines of the 
public’s views over many decades on a number of high profile decision 
areas,2 rarely do other obscure, but important, cases or topics receive 
similar treatment.  Thus, we have a great deal of data on public attitudes 
towards gun control, abortion, affirmative action, and now, health insurance 
reform,3 but minimal knowledge of what the public thinks about the scores 
of other important topics and controversies before the Court each term.  
With this “blind spot” in mind, this essay examines five important cases 
from the 2011 Term with which the public are unfamiliar and compares 
these results with the results from our first poll last year, when we also 
polled public attitudes regarding several obscure cases prior to the Court 
issuing its decisions. 
During the 2010 Term, we polled four cases to help us plumb the popular 
constitutionalism phenomenon.4  We were genuinely surprised by the 
results and encouraged to gather additional data and search for patterns.  
Thus, during the 2011 Term, we offered American voters the opportunity to 
weigh in on six constitutional issues pending before the Court.  The first 
 
 2. See generally PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel 
Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008). 
 3. Id.  For a discussion of recent polling on health care, see Bruce G. Peabody & Peter 
J. Woolley, The Public’s Constitutional Thinking and the Fate of Health Care Reform:  
PPACA As Case Study, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 26 (2012), 
fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/volume/81/26_Peabody.pdf. 
 4. See Bruce G. Peabody & Peter J. Woolley, Res Publica:  Public Opinion, 
Constitutional Law, and the Supreme Court’s 2010 Term, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 
10, 16–20 (2011), http://fordhamlawreview.org/assets/res-gestae/volume/80/10_Peabody.pdf 
[hereinafter Peabody & Woolley, Res Republica] (discussing results from the 2010 term); 
Peter J. Woolley & Bruce G. Peabody, Polls, the Public, and Popular Perspectives on 
Constitutional Issues, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 22, 24–25 (2011), http://
fordhamlawreview.org/assets/resgestae/volume/80/22_Woolley.pdf (explaining the methods 
and rationale for our polling). 
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issue, from United States v. Jones,5 asked whether police must have a 
proper warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle.6  The 
second, from Lafler v. Cooper,7 examined the limits of the right to counsel, 
asking whether defendants had a right to correct advice about a plea 
bargain.8  This question was distinct from that posed in our third case, 
Missouri v. Frye,9 which probed whether defendants must be informed of a 
plea offer.10  Fourth, we asked the public to consider Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission11 and whether there is a “ministerial exception” to the First 
Amendment such that church employees are not covered by the same labor 
protections as employees of other organizations.12  The fifth issue, from 
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,13 concerned whether prison 
guards may strip search prisoners without reasonable suspicion, regardless 
of a prisoner’s offense.14  Finally, we asked respondents to consider the 
divisive issue posed in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,15 concerning the propriety of a health insurance mandate.16  
Because of its greater press coverage and awareness by the public, as well 
as its highly partisan context, we treat polling on the Florida case as a 
separate query from the other five cases and therefore analyze in a separate 
essay.17 
 
 5. No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf. 
 6. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, High Court Agrees with 
Public in US v Jones:  Electronic Tails Need a Warrant 2–4 (Jan. 23, 2012), available at 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/tailing/ [hereinafter GPS Monitoring Press Release]. 
 7. No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-209.pdf. 
 8. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Like US Supreme Court, US 
Voters Split on Bad Legal Advice 3–6 (Mar. 22, 2012), available at 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/badadvice/ [hereinafter Legal Advice Press Release]. 
 9. No. 10-444 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-444.pdf. 
 10. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3–6. 
 11. No. 10-553 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf. 
 12. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, In Contrast to High Court, 
US Voters Split on Freedom of Churches to Hire and Fire 2–4 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/hosanna/ [hereinafter Ministerial Exception Press Release]. 
 13. No. 10-945 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-945.pdf. 
 14. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Nation Sides with New 
Jersey Motorist Against Court, Automatic Strip Searches 2–4 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2012/strip/ [hereinafter Strip Searches Press Release]. 
 15. No. 11-393 (U.S. June 28, 2012), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf. 
 16. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Health Insurance:  Can 
They Or Can’t They? 2–5 (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/
2012/require/ [hereinafter Health Insurance Press Release]. 
 17. For our analysis of the Sebelius decision, see Peabody & Woolley, supra note 3. 
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I.  THE ENDLESS WAR ON ERROR:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
OUR POLLING TECHNIQUES 
The polling that underlies this research was based on a national, 
randomly selected sample of registered voters.  The sample for the 2011 
Term comprised 855 voters recruited and interviewed by telephone, 
including both landline and cell phones.18  Professionals conducted the 
interviews using a script provided to them.19  The margin of error for our 
sample of 855 randomly selected respondents is +/- 3.5 percentage points at 
the 95 percent level of confidence—meaning that nineteen of twenty runs of 
the experiment will produce variations in the “topline” (aggregate) results 
of just a few points.20 
Consistent with our previous effort in the Supreme Court’s 2010 Term, 
two main criteria informed our choice of cases.  First, we selected cases 
whose core issues would be of sufficient interest to voters that they would 
remain engaged.  Practically speaking, when constructing a questionnaire 
one must remember that telephone interviews and human beings have finite, 
if somewhat variable, limitations.  Even under the best conditions, a poll 
entails a stranger telephoning in the evening, often at a respondent’s home, 
and asking him or her to sacrifice time immediately, generally with no 
reward other than a perceived obligation of civic duty.  Having accepted the 
initial request, respondents must still reply to questions about their views on 
public affairs, carrying on for about ten minutes on a variety of topics. 
To minimize nonattitudes, nonresponses, question refusals, and interview 
break-offs, it is good practice not to try respondents’ patience and to be 
clear, swift, and mercifully short.  That said, given the nature of our 
polling—which consisted of a series of questions about sometimes related 
but substantively distinct areas—by the time anyone was asked about, say, 
the constitutional tradeoff of law enforcement needs and privacy interests in 
 
 18. The telephone eliminates the possibility of the interviewer using physical signs or 
gestures to get his or her point across.  Questions were presented in a neutral manner, as 
follows:  “Some people argue . . . .  Other people argue . . . .  Which comes closer to your 
view?” See, e.g., Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 3.  Nevertheless, a 
telephone interview cannot eliminate all external influences, as it is possible that people at 
home might have distractions that affect their responses.  Televisions, computer games, 
children, spouses, pets, and grumbling stomachs all may distract and detract from the 
respondent’s concentration. 
 19. For the exact question wording and order, see 2012 Releases Year to Date, 
PUBLICMIND POLL, http://publicmind.fdu.edu/prioryears/2012.html (last updated Sept. 17, 
2012). 
 20. The margin of error for subgroups is larger and varies by the size of that subgroup.  
Survey results are also subject to nonsampling error.  This kind of error cannot be measured 
and arises from a number of factors including, but not limited to, nonresponse (eligible 
individuals who refuse to be interviewed), question wording, question order, and variations 
among interviewers.  The interviews were conducted by Opinion America of Cedar Knolls, 
New Jersey, from November 29, 2011, through December 5, 2011.  Professionally trained 
interviewers utilized a computer assisted telephone interviewing system.  The total combined 
sample, which included both land-lines and cell phones, was mathematically weighted to 
match known demographics of age, race, and gender among the voting population.  See id., 
for press releases on polling results that contain details of the sample population. 
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United States v. Jones, he would already have answered a gauntlet of 
questions from presidential candidate preferences and the direction of the 
country to his attitude toward betting on professional sports.21 
The second criterion we used in our selection was that the core issue in 
the case had to be amenable to polling; that is, not so complex that it would 
be impossible to represent a core issue clearly and quickly to our polled 
public.  Again, the issue would be presented on the telephone to a stranger 
and would be presented to as wide a variety of respondents as there are 
voters.  We deemed both of these factors as important constraints on polling 
individuals on complex constitutional issues.22 
Beyond these basic selection criteria, we tried to follow “best practices” 
to achieve the most useful polling results.  One such practice is to balance 
each question to the extent possible.  Respondents should not get any 
indication that one answer is more desirable to the interviewer, or to the 
question writers, than another.  The questions should signal parity in the 
proffered choices, in the following manner:  “Some people argue that . . . 
and other people argue that . . . .”  The questions should invite agreement 
with any possibility:  “Which comes closer to your view?”  Meanwhile, the 
answer categories should be parallel, containing language that signals parity 
and equal validity.  For instance, in our polling on Hosanna-Tabor we 
phrased the conflict as follows:  “To protect religious freedom, churches 
have . . .” and, “To protect individual rights, churches have . . . .”23  
Moreover, the answers are always read in random order so that no one 
answer category is always read first or last.24 
 
 21. For exact question wording and order of questions preceding the questions on 
pending Supreme Court decisions, see Press Release, Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s 
PublicMind, Gingrich is New Fave, Voters Approve of Iraq Withdrawal, President Beats All 
Comers (Dec. 7, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/newfave/, and Press Release, 
Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Too Soon to Think about Vice Presidential 
Candidates?  For some . . . but Not Others (Dec. 14, 2011), http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/
toosoon/. 
 22. It must also be remembered that most voters are neither lawyers nor Court watchers 
and may also not be informed on the topics of the day nor accustomed to talking about 
public affairs.  Furthermore, they may not only be inattentive to the Court but also relatively 
uneducated.  Indeed, when it comes to cases on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court, voters 
of many backgrounds are untutored laypersons.  We did not poll on many cases of interest to 
us, or of potential interest to the public, because we were unable to construct questions that 
were easily accessible to the general public. 
 23. Ministerial Exception Press Release, supra note 12, at 2. 
 24. We followed other best practices, obvious but too important to ignore.  First, we did 
not ask one question about a case.  To keep the interview moving and the respondent 
engaged, we asked at least two questions.  The first question served the main purpose of 
simply introducing the topic.  For example, to begin the four question series on Lafler, we 
asked, “Are you aware or not aware that the U.S. Constitution gives people the right to a 
lawyer in criminal cases?” Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 4.  We were not 
especially interested in the answer to this question (92 percent said they were aware), but we 
were keenly interested in establishing the topic, helping our respondents to make a cognitive 
shift from one set of queries to another, more pointed set about lawyers representing clients 
in the context of plea bargaining. Id. at 3.  For other topics, we began by asking respondents 
whether they had ever heard about a particular case by surfacing some of its key identifying 
or orienting features.  For example, with Jones we introduced the subject by saying:  “In one 
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Clearly, the questions we put to voters were not as rich in terms of their 
fact patterns, legal complexity, or overall context as the arguments 
submitted to the Court.  The voters in our sample received only the most 
basic and relevant background—indeed, the equivalent of index cards for 
the petitioner and respondent in each case.  Nevertheless, we contend that 
this information was thoughtful and free of jargon, drawing choices in clear 
contrast. 
II.  CASES AND RESULTS:  LAWYERS, DRUGS, AND MINISTERS 
Our cases from 2011 Term included two search and seizure cases (United 
States v. Jones and Florence v. Board of Freeholders), two intertwined 
cases involving the right to counsel (Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye), 
and a First Amendment dispute involving the contours of the “ministerial 
exception” to employment discrimination laws (Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC).  
The cases addressed very different questions of civil liberties and civil 
rights and, like our study of the 2010 Term, brought up issues with 
implications for both criminal justice and religious accommodation. 
A.  United States v. Jones:  Popular Constitutionalism and Fourth 
Amendment Limits on Technology 
In Jones, the Court considered whether attaching a GPS device to a 
vehicle and then using that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements for 
twenty-eight days constituted an unreasonable search, for which a warrant 
is required under the Fourth Amendment.25  The case involved suspected 
drug dealer Antoine Jones, who police tracked for almost a month as he 
rode around conducting business in his wife’s car.26  Jones, a nightclub 
operator, was subsequently convicted and received a life sentence for his 
part in a drug trafficking scheme.27  However, his lawyers appealed on 
grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by dint of a 
warrantless search.28  To obtain evidence against him, police had installed 
the GPS tracking device without a valid warrant, as the date of a previously 
obtained warrant had expired and the police installed the device outside the 
jurisdiction in which it was valid.29  The Court was faced with the question 
of whether attaching a GPS device and following the car’s movements 
constituted a “search” for which a valid warrant was even required?30  
 
case, the question is whether police need a warrant—like a search warrant—in order to put a 
GPS tracking device on a suspect’s car.” GPS Monitoring Press Release, supra note 6, at 2.  
Then the interviewer immediately asked, “Have you heard or read about this case . . . ?” Id.  
This practice allowed us to introduce the topic, keep the respondent attentive, and test our 
sense about whether the case indeed had a low public profile. 
 25. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1259.pdf. 
 26. No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–2. 
 27. Id. at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 1–2. 
 30. See generally Brief for Respondent, Jones, No. 10-1259, 2011 WL 4479076. 
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Despite the complexity of cases involving the intersection of privacy 
expectations and technology, this question was sufficiently direct to set 
before the American voter. 
For this case, we offered two possible arguments and asked people which 
came closer to their view.  On the one hand, we said,  “[O]nce you drive 
your car, your movements are public anyway.  Using a tracking device just 
saves police the expense and difficulty of following the car with 
detectives.”31  On the other hand, we said, “[T]he car is private property.  
Police need permission from the owner, or from a judge, to put a tracking 
device on personal property.”32 
Surprisingly, in this instance (and others), only a small percentage could 
not make up their minds.  Just 6 percent said they did not know or had 
mixed views about this basic choice.33  Three-quarters (73%) sided with the 
position advocated by respondent Jones and identified the government’s use 
of GPS monitoring as a Fourth Amendment search.34  Thus, voters 
concluded that police should be required to obtain a proper warrant before 
putting a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle.  Only 22 percent thought 
convenience to the police, savings to taxpayers, or law enforcement’s need 
to track the car were values that should prevail.35  Indeed, the wide 
consensus against warrantless use of GPS tracking technology was the most 
lopsided result of the five cases polled. 
In light of the Court’s subsequent ruling in favor of Jones, it is also worth 
noting that the public’s agreement crossed generations, parties, and races.  
Similarly high percentages of Republicans (67%), independents (68%), and 
Democrats (78%) agreed that a warrant was needed.36  Likewise, those 
under thirty years of age agreed (74%) with those over sixty years of age 
(66%).37  Non-whites (80%) and whites (70%) both concluded placing the 
GPS device constituted an unconstitutional search.38 
We note that the polled public did not know that the D.C. Circuit had 
already thrown out Jones’s conviction on the grounds that GPS tracking 
violated his Fourth Amendment freedom from “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”39  Furthermore, it is likely that few of the respondents ever 
learned of the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision, issued only weeks 
after our poll, to affirm that a proper warrant must be obtained when using a 
GPS device to track the movements of a suspected criminal over a lengthy 
 
 31. GPS Monitoring Press Release, supra note 6, at 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012). 
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period.40  With respect to the basic ruling in the case, the Court and the 
public were in accord. 
The result suggests that the public and the Court are similarly cautious 
about the implications for privacy in the brave new age of GPS.  As noted, 
the public had little trouble deciding the case, with three quarters in 
agreement with the respondent Jones and just 6 percent reporting that they 
were not sure how to resolve the conflict.41  The Court, meanwhile, was not 
only unanimous but also warned broadly about governmental scrutiny of 
citizens.  “Awareness that the Government may be watching chills 
associational and expressive freedoms,” wrote Justice Sotomayor, 
concurring with Justice Scalia’s majority opinion.42  Justice Sotomayor 
continued, “[T]he Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that 
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.”43 
Arguably, the Court’s 9–0 opinion in favor of Jones masked considerable 
division among the Justices about the proper legal reasoning for that 
outcome.  For five Justices—the Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Kennedy, Scalia, Sotomayor, and Thomas—the legal analysis turned on the 
government’s installation of the GPS tracking device on the car, a Fourth 
Amendment invasion of privacy because police “physically occupied 
private property.”44  For the remaining Justices—Justices Alito, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan—the physical trespass onto Jones’s property (in this 
case, his wife’s car) was less important than the government’s lengthy 
monitoring of the respondent.45 
These distinctions partially reflect the Justices’ concerns about how to 
apply this case as precedent in the future to other technologies and other 
episodes of law enforcement monitoring.  We would not be surprised if, in 
teasing out some of these other scenarios and issues, we uncovered greater 
diversity in the views of the polled public as well.  Our core conclusion 
remains the same:  on the basic and specific legal issue posed in the Jones 
case, we find a great deal of overlap between the Court’s judgment and that 
of the public. 
For our purposes, Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in the case may be 
the most interesting in signaling the essential link between the Court’s work 
and public opinion.  Alito acknowledged that changing public opinion has a 
role in determining what is a reasonable expectation of privacy and what is 
 
 40. See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
 41. The result is also consistent with the many polls summarized by EPIC, the Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, showing that the public is willing to make certain tradeoffs on 
privacy for national security purposes; absent national security concerns, however, the public 
insists on privacy protections from new, privacy threatening technologies. See Public 
Opinion on Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).  
We thank Matthew Sundquist for directing us to this point. 
 42. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 4 (majority opinion). 
 45. Id. at 12–14 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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an unreasonable, unconstitutional search.46  He further observed that 
“[d]ramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular 
expectations [of privacy] are in flux.”47  Accordingly, these developments 
may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.  New 
technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense 
of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.  And even 
if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new 
technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this 
development as inevitable.48 
Clearly, Justice Alito’s remarks underscore the vital, unavoidable, and 
reciprocal relationship between the public’s vision of constitutional values 
(such as privacy) and the way in which courts and other public officials try 
to give shape to our constitutional law. 
B.  Florence v. Board of Freeholders:  Popular Constitutionalism and 
Strip Searching Prisoners 
Florence was our second case involving criminal procedure and civil 
liberties.49  In this case, state troopers in Burlington County, New Jersey, 
ran a license plate check and stopped Albert Florence, an African 
American,50 as he was driving with his wife.51  He was arrested on a bench 
warrant issued in Essex County, New Jersey, for failure to pay a court 
fine.52  He had, in fact, paid the fine53 and even carried papers 
demonstrating his good legal standing.54  During the stop, his wife 
produced this seemingly exonerative record to no avail.55  Thus began a 
week long ordeal in which Florence was strip searched twice:  first at the 
Burlington County jail and then at the Essex County jail where he had been 
transferred to appear before a magistrate.56  The judge quickly determined 
that Florence was not wanted and ordered the defendant released.57  
Nevertheless, Florence’s post-arrest treatment raised the question of 
whether it was reasonable to strip search defendants automatically even for 
 
 46. Id. at 5–7. 
 47. Id. at 10. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Florence v. Board of Freeholders, No. 10-945 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-945.pdf. 
 50. We mention the race of the petitioner because it is noted in the Supreme Court briefs 
for the case and in light of New Jersey law enforcement’s recent, controversial history of 
“racial profiling.” See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, ACLU of New Jersey Files Turnpike 
Racial Profiling Lawsuit (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/racial-
justice/aclu-new-jersey-files-turnpike-racial-profiling-lawsuit. 
 51. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Florence, No. 10-945, 2011 WL 2508902, at *3 (“Petitioner 
kept with him a copy of the official document certifying that [he had paid the fine].”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2–3. 
 57. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 54, at 6–7. 
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minor offenses absent suspicion that the suspect was carrying weapons or 
drugs. 
In order to surface the core constitutional question at hand in Florence, 
we asked our national sample of voters whether “prison officials can 
automatically strip search any person admitted to a jail, even if it is for a 
minor offense” or “prison officials need to have a reasonable suspicion 
before they strip search any person admitted to a jail, especially if it is for a 
minor offense like failing to pay a traffic ticket.”58 
More than four of five voters (82%) said they had never heard of the 
case, yet just 4 percent subsequently reported they were unsure or had a 
mixed opinion in the case.59  Notwithstanding their unfamiliarity with the 
case, the public was ready to weigh in on the legal controversy.  Two-thirds 
(65%) said the same search procedure should not apply to everyone 
regardless of the nature of their offense.60  Only 31 percent said that prison 
officials may automatically strip search everyone, a two-to-one margin in 
favor of the petitioner’s argument (which, of course, they had never heard 
before).61 
The public’s untutored opinion mirrored the written law of New Jersey 
and of Burlington County where Florence was first strip searched.62  That 
law prohibits strip searches of prisoners at intake generally unless there is 
reasonable suspicion that a weapon, drugs, or other contraband may be 
found.63  In fact, the jail recorded and subsequently contended that Florence 
was not strip searched but only visually observed at arms’ length with his 
clothes off while he lifted his arms, rotated, squatted, and lifted his testes.64 
Justice Kennedy noted, however, that “[t]he opinions in earlier proceedings, 
the briefs on file, and some cases of this Court refer to a ‘strip search.’”65  
Indeed, “[t]he term is imprecise.”66 
The Court ruled 5–4 against the petitioner and in favor of allowing 
routine searches of anyone in the general prison population.67  This opinion 
was at odds with the public’s judgment. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy cited the overriding need for 
safety and security in any detention center; although people arrested for 
minor offences are often among the detainee population, maintaining 
security while drawing innumerable distinctions within this group would 
 
 58. Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 2. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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 62. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1 (2012) (directing that strip searches are prohibited 
absent a warrant, probable cause, or consent); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 10A:31-8.4–.7 (2012) 
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 63. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:161A-1. 
 64. Florence, No. 10-945, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2012). 
 65. Id. at 4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 19. 
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simply be “unworkable.”68  Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito, 
and Thomas joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, but Roberts, Alito, and 
Thomas all voiced doubts, as well.69  Their votes were essential to 
achieving a majority on the outcome, but they emphasized that while it may 
be reasonable to apply the same search procedures to everyone in the 
specific prisoner population and conditions present in this case, it might not 
always be reasonable to do so.70  The ruling, they pointed out, did not 
authorize jail officials to conduct a strip search unless the prisoner was to be 
placed among other prisoners at the facility.  Thus, on closer inspection, the 
narrow 5–4 ruling in Florence was even more divided and will most likely 
serve as a somewhat uncertain precedent for analogous cases in the future. 
Meanwhile, the four dissenters unknowingly agreed with the American 
public that it was altogether unreasonable to subject minor offenders to such 
a “humiliating” search “unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion 
to believe the individual possessed drugs or other contraband.”71 
The Court split 5–4 along ideological lines, with the five “conservatives” 
making the majority.  A notable difference between public opinion and the 
opinion of the Court, then, is that the former did not split ideologically.  As 
in Jones, the public’s judgment on the case cut across all demographics.  
Two-thirds of both Democrats and Republicans were against automatic strip 
searches.72  Likewise, self-identified conservatives, moderates, and liberals 
were in agreement.73 
C.  Cooper and Frye:  Popular Constitutionalism and the Right to Counsel 
in Plea Bargaining 
While Jones and Florence dealt with procedural matters involving law 
enforcement, two other important cases from the 2011 Term involved 
questions about the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel,” particularly as it 
impacts the plea bargaining process.  Criminal defendants have a right to 
counsel, but whether that includes a right to good (i.e., strategically sound) 
counsel was the core issue posed both to the public and to the Court. 
In Cooper, respondent Anthony Cooper fired a gun at the victim’s head 
and, despite missing, chased her while firing several rounds into her lower 
 
 68. Id. at 14. 
 69. The Chief Justice and Justice Alito each wrote separate concurring opinions. See id. 
at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring).  Although they both joined 
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 70. Id. at 1 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t is important for me that the Court does not 
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 71. Id. at 2, 4 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 72. Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 14, at 2. 
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extremities.74  Cooper stood accused of assault with intent to murder, 
among other things, and faced a potential sentence of 185–360 months’ 
imprisonment.75  Although the prosecutor had offered to dismiss two of the 
charges against Cooper in exchange for a guilty plea—which would have 
resulted in a maximum sentence of 51–85 months in prison—Cooper 
followed his attorney’s advice to turn down the offer and hold out for a 
better deal because, in the attorney’s view, the prosecution could not prove 
Cooper’s intent to kill.76  After all, counsel reasoned, after the first bullet 
missed the victim’s head, the bullets Cooper subsequently fired at her all 
struck below the waist:  one in the hip, one to the side of the abdomen, and 
two to the buttocks.77  However, the prosecutor refused to offer a better deal 
and went forward with the trial for intent to murder.78  Cooper was 
subsequently convicted, and the judge sentenced him to the mandatory 
minimum of 185–360 months in prison—three times the sentence he would 
have received had he accepted the plea.79 
Did this constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?  There was no 
question that the trial was fair, and counsel’s conduct at the trial was not in 
dispute.  Moreover, accepting a plea bargain would have limited and 
waived some of Cooper’s rights including “all the constitutional protections 
a trial entails.”80 
In speaking to the public, we consolidated the history and relevant 
information in Cooper to two sentences and offered two possible positions.  
We asked our respondents whether the defendant had a right to good advice 
from his lawyer, rendering the rejected plea-bargain “a case of unfair legal 
procedure” entitled to a “do-over.”81  Alternatively, we allowed respondents 
to agree with the proposition that “you can’t jam up the legal system with 
re-trials just because lawyers sometimes give bad advice.”82 
Faced with this choice, the public split closely:  44 percent said the case 
should receive a do-over, but a statistically equivalent share, 42 percent, 
said this was impractical.83  The remaining fourteen percent in this case 
were undecided.84  Women, Democrats, and liberals—by five-to-four 
ratios—tended to say that the defendant had a right to good advice and that 
the procedure leading to his conviction was unfair.85  Men, independents, 
and Republicans leaned the other way by similar margins.86 
 
 74. No. 10-209, slip op. at 1–2 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.supreme
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The most interesting divergence in this case, however, related to race.  
Whites split fairly evenly, with 45 percent saying that lawyers sometimes 
just give bad advice, while 41 percent said that an inadvisable, rejected plea 
bargain should trigger a do-over.87  African Americans, on the other hand, 
found by a nearly three-to-one margin that the scenario was unfair and that 
a defendant has the right to good advice.88  We infer that different 
experiences with, and perceptions of, the criminal justice system are 
responsible for these divergent outcomes. 
In early April 2012, months after our polling concluded, the Court 
revealed its own divisions, ruling 5–4 that a defendant’s right to counsel 
includes good advice even in the context of plea bargaining.89  However, 
the Court ruled that a good deal of the burden in this context would fall on 
the accused.  Specifically, the accused must show that, 
but for the ineffective advice of counsel, there is a reasonable probability 
that the plea offer would have been presented to the court . . . that the 
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, 
or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under 
the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.90 
In a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts, 
Justice Scalia criticized the majority for opening “a whole new field of 
constitutionalized criminal procedure:  plea-bargaining law.”91  Scalia’s 
dissent concluded that “the ordinary criminal process has become too long, 
too expensive, and unpredictable, in no small part as a consequence of an 
intricate federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed on the States by this 
Court in pursuit of perfect justice.”92  These remarks seem to reflect the 
sentiment expressed by much of the public that “you can’t jam up the legal 
system with re-trials just because lawyers sometimes give bad advice.”93 
Cooper was tied to another case involving a plea offer gone awry:  
Frye.94  Here, the issue was not that the defense counsel offered bad advice 
in connection with a plea offer but that he failed to inform his client that a 
plea bargain was even available.95  In this case, respondent Frye was 
charged with his fourth instance of driving with a revoked license and, as a 
result, faced a maximum sentence of four years’ imprisonment.96  The 
prosecutor offered defense counsel a choice of two plea bargains, each of 
which would have resulted in a sentence of no more than ninety days in 
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 89. See Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Id. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Legal Advice Press Release, supra note 8, at 3. 
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prison.97 By the time the defendant became aware of the prosecutor’s 
offers, however, both had expired and other events interceded, including 
another arrest of Mr. Frye on the same offense.98  Frye eventually pled 
guilty without the option of any plea bargain, and the court meted out a 
three year sentence.99  Frye appealed, arguing that had he known about the 
initial plea offer he would have accepted it and received a much lighter 
penalty.100  Conversely, the state of Missouri argued, “[T]he accused has no 
right to a plea bargain, and a plea bargain standing alone has no 
constitutional significance.”101 
We asked the public whether the defendant’s sentence should be 
overturned because he never had the chance to consider a lesser sentence or 
upheld because “the defendant doesn’t have a right to a plea bargain, only a 
right to a fair trial.”102  In this test, the public and the Court matched up 
more closely than in Cooper. 
The majority of respondents (53%) said Frye’s sentence, which had been 
imposed without his knowledge of the plea bargain option, should be 
overturned.103  Meanwhile, only a third (34%) said that the defendant’s 
rights were limited to a fair trial.104  Again, there was a pronounced 
difference in the category of race.  While white voters favored overturning 
the sentence by 49 percent to 36 percent, black voters favored overturning it 
by 67 percent to 22 percent.105 
The Court’s 5–4 split very much mirrored public opinion with respect 
both to the substance and the ratio of division.  A majority of the Court 
concluded that the “Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are 
rejected.”106  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, observed that the 
“simple reality” is that plea bargains have “become so central to the 
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have 
responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met 
to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment 
requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”107 
Justice Scalia, who read aloud his dissenting opinions in both Cooper and 
Frye, called the rulings “inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment and 
decades of our precedent.”108  Scalia maintained that each case should have 
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been resolved based on the fairness of the trial process, not the integrity of 
the plea process by which a fair trial was waived.109  In Frye, he observed, 
“it can be said not only that the process was fair, but that the defendant 
acknowledged the correctness of his conviction.”110 
The dissenting Justices conceded that the “plea-bargaining process is a 
subject worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal 
convictions are obtained.”111  Nevertheless, they also noted that this process 
“happens not to be . . . a subject covered by the Sixth Amendment, which is 
concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the fairness of 
conviction.”112 
Not surprisingly, the Court’s split divided the four Justices appointed by 
Democrats on one side and four Justices appointed by Republicans on the 
other, with Justice Kennedy holding the deciding vote.  Likewise, among 
the public, approximately two thirds of liberals and Democrats were in 
favor of overturning the defendant’s sentence, while Republicans and 
conservatives were essentially split on the question.113 
D.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC:  
Popular Constitutionalism and a Ministerial Exception to 
the First Amendment 
Finally, we have the case of Hosanna-Tabor, which addresses limits on 
religious organizations’ ability to hire and fire employees who double as 
ministers, irrespective of federal laws that forbid various forms of 
discrimination in employment decisions.114  In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
congregation of a Redford, Michigan, church dismissed an employee on the 
grounds that she was no longer “called.”115 
Many of the church’s teachers, though not all, were classified as “called” 
(i.e., considered to have been called to their vocation by God through the 
church’s congregation).116  Once called, a teacher receives the title of 
“Minister of Religion, Commissioned.”117  To be eligible for this title, a 
candidate must complete courses in theological study, obtain the 
endorsement of her local Synod district, and pass an oral examination given 
by the faculty committee.118  Called teachers may serve for an open ended 
term subject to rescission only for cause and only by a supermajority vote 
of the congregation.119  In contrast, “lay” or “contract” teachers are not 
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required to undergo any special training nor are they appointed by the 
congregation and are only hired for renewable one-year terms.120 
Cheryl Perich, who taught religion (among other subjects) to 
kindergarteners and led prayer services, was among those teachers 
considered called to her vocation.121  When she fell ill with narcolepsy 
several years later, however, the congregation wished to release her from 
called status.122  Perich, then cleared by her doctors to return to work, 
refused the offer.123 
The awkwardness that ensued prompted the congregation to rescind 
Perich’s call.124  Meanwhile, Perich filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) asserting that the church 
had retaliated against her for opposing its decision to change her status, a 
decision she claimed was based on its erroneous conclusion that she was 
too ill to carry out her duties and resentment that she challenged its wishes 
at all.125 
Setting theological and medical questions aside, the case amounted to the 
following questions:  Could the church dismiss Perich on the religious 
grounds that she was no longer called?  Or was being no longer called 
simply a mask for discrimination? 
In exploring the important legal questions in this case, we asked voters 
whether “[in order] to protect religious freedom, churches have the right to 
hire and fire employees for religious reasons without interference from 
government rules,” or “[in order] to protect individual rights, churches have 
to follow the same rules as government and business when it comes to 
hiring and firing.”126  Once again, the public split quite evenly: 46 percent 
sided with the church, supporting its unencumbered right to hire and fire, 
and 43 percent sided with the teacher, a division that amounted to a 
statistical tie.127  Only 10 percent of voters were unsure or had mixed 
views.128 
Behind these different views were clear partisan and ideological 
differences.  A majority of Democrats (56%) believed that an individual’s 
rights must be protected, whereas a greater majority of Republicans (64%) 
believed that government may not interfere with church hiring.129  Self 
described liberals, by a similar five-to-three margin, believed that a church 
must abide by existing employment laws, while a majority of conservatives 
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(60%) agreed with the church’s argument and its prerogative to change the 
vocational status of its employees to enable their termination.130 
Whatever the differences among the public, the Court was not of two 
minds in this dispute, ruling 9–0 in an opinion delivered by the Chief 
Justice in January 2012, just weeks after our polling had concluded.131  The 
Court held that church ministers, however they are defined, serve as an 
exception to the antidiscrimination rules that govern other businesses, 
nonprofits, and government agencies.132  Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts observed that “[t]he interest of society in the enforcement of 
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important.  But so too is 
the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, 
teach their faith, and carry out their mission.”133  He concluded that 
“[w]hen a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her 
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the 
balance for us.  The church must be free to choose those who will guide it 
on its way.”134 
Clearly, the public was not this unified, decisive, or forceful.  It is 
intriguing that the Justices were in strong agreement regarding this area of 
First Amendment law, while the general public splintered on the competing 
values of equal employment protection and religious accommodation. 
III.  POLL POSITION:  TAKING STOCK OF POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND THE 2011 TERM 
All five of the constitutional cases discussed in this essay concern 
individual rights, as opposed to questions about the scope of government 
powers or federalism.  In all five, the public was barely aware of the case, if 
they were familiar at all.  Yet, in all five, the public had little trouble 
identifying a preference for deciding the controversy.135  In several cases 
from this term and our prior surveyed term—such as Brown v. Plata, a 
prison overcrowding case from the 2010 Term,136 and Florence, the strip 
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search case from this term—the public’s pronounced opinion was in stark 
contrast with the ruling delivered by the Court.137 
While our surveys cannot register the intensity of the public’s views, the 
results underscore a point made frequently by scholars:  the Court’s power 
derives, in part, from its relative seclusion from the public eye.  In this way, 
high profile, widely discussed cases, such as National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, may be the exceptions that prove the rule.  
This is to say that the Court is able, for the most part, to do its work away 
from an immediate tumult of public opinion, the result being that public 
attitudes toward the Court as an institution (so called “diffuse” support) 
tend to remain positive even when Court opinions go against the wishes of a 
majority of the public. 
To reinforce this point—that public opinion need not mesh perfectly with 
the Court’s individual decisions for the Court to enjoy a broad reputation 
for legitimacy—we will take another look at how our five recent measures 
of public opinion reconcile with the corresponding Court decisions.  The 
cases can be classified in several ways. 
A.  Agree To Disagree:  Cases Where the Court or the Public Express 
Strong Consensus or Disagreement 
One approach is to compare cases where the margins of agreement or 
disagreement, within either the Court or the public, were high.  Of the five 
cases, three resulted in 5–4 decisions by the Court:  Florence, Cooper, and 
Frye.  Only in Cooper was public opinion also closely divided.138  In 
Florence and Frye, however, the public had a decided preference.  The 
public’s twenty-point preference in Frye for the defendant accorded with 
the Court’s 5–4 ruling.139  In contrast, the public’s thirty-point preference in 
Florence for the defendant was in contrast to the Court’s 5–4 majority.140 
The two other cases, Jones and Hosanna-Tabor, resulted in unanimous 
decisions by the Court.141  In Hosanna-Tabor, public opinion was split 
evenly, in stark contrast to the Court’s emphatic ruling for the church.142  In 
Jones, however, the public’s fifty-point margin in favor of the defendant 
was just as emphatic as the Court’s unanimous ruling, a perfect 
alignment.143 
In light of our limited sample, we are unable to conclude that when the 
Court has a close ruling, the public’s opinion will be similarly divided.  Nor 
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can we say that when the Court rules with great consensus, public opinion 
will be similarly unified.  No pattern in this regard emerged in our cases 
from this term or when combining these cases with those from the previous 
term. 
B.  The Political Divide:  Cases Where the Court or the Public Split on 
Ideological Differences 
Another way we can classify the cases is to identify those where clear 
partisan divides emerged among the public or the Court.  Importantly, if not 
surprisingly, the cases decided by narrow margins—Florence, Cooper, and 
Frye—reflected obvious partisan cleavages within the Court, with Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito on one side and 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan on the other.  In only two 
of those three cases, however, did similar partisan divides emerge in the 
public.  In Cooper and Frye, both cases regarding criminal procedure, 
Democrats differed significantly from Republicans, as did liberals from 
conservatives.144  In Florence, however, public opinion did not reflect the 
Court’s partisanship.145 
Meanwhile, the Court’s unanimous opinions in Jones and Hosanna-
Tabor did not evidence partisan division.  This result was consistent with 
the public’s opinion of Jones, such that the Court and public were equally 
emphatic that the police’s use of GPS technology to monitor the defendant 
for an extended period constituted an unreasonable search for which a valid 
warrant was required.146  In Hosanna-Tabor, however, the public broke 
with the Court and voiced strong partisan differences, with Democrats 
favoring the same statutory rules for church employers and Republicans 
favoring limits on government interference with religious institutions.147 
Consequently, we cannot say that the Court’s partisanship reflects the 
public’s partisanship or vice versa. 
C.  The Ties That Bind:  Cases Where the Court and Public Agree 
A third way to classify the cases is to identify those where the Court’s 
majority and the public majority were in agreement.  In Cooper and 
Hosanna-Tabor, however, public opinion was evenly split, so one could 
reasonably object that it is too tenuous to say that the Court’s decision 
contradicted public opinion.  Alternatively, one could say that the Court’s 
close vote in Cooper reflects the public’s divided opinion.148  In Hosanna-
Tabor, however, where the public also split evenly, the Court’s unanimity 
was, in some sense, at odds with the divided public.149 
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In Frye and Jones, both the public and the Court were in agreement. The 
public’s twenty-point margin in Frye was more decisive, however, than the 
Court’s 5–4 majority.150  In Jones, the public’s emphatic preference 
matched that of the Court.151 
Only in one case can we say that the public’s preference was clearly at 
odds with the Court’s ruling.  In Florence, the public disapproved of prison 
officials’ broad authority to conduct strip searches regardless of the 
inmate’s crime.152  In contrast, the Court upheld the procedures of the 
prison’s administrators, albeit by a small margin.153 
In summary, we cannot conclude that the Court and the public were 
generally in accord or disagreement.  We can only say that the Court’s 
rulings did not fly in the face of public opinion generally, with the 
exception of Florence. 
D.  Implications of Our Findings 
Although many scholars have concluded that the opinions of the Court 
and public are often aligned,154 we are offering a more cautious view.  We 
suspect that this common viewpoint reflects some substantial accord 
between the public and the Court in the most salient cases, but this, of 
course, only reflects a fraction of the Court’s docket.  Our study invites a 
wider review of the circumstances in which the Court and the public act 
together, a review that can now be bolstered with greater evidence from 
cases and controversies of a lower profile. 
In light of our findings, we believe that the most egregious anomalies— 
Hosanna-Tabor and Florence, the cases for which the gap between the 
Court and public opinion seemed widest—deserve a closer look. 
In Hosanna–Tabor, it was not that public preference clearly went against 
the decision of the Court.155  In fact, public preference split fairly evenly 
(46% to 43%).  What strikes us, however, was that the Court emphatically 
interpreted the First Amendment to create a new, bright line rule that 
protects the autonomy of religious organizations.  At least three factors may 
help to explain the apparent discrepancy between the public and the Court 
in this case. 
First, the Court’s opinion emphasized the lengthy history of recognizing 
religious organizations’ discretion to control themselves internally, 
including employment decisions.  The weight of this history along with the 
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Court’s frequent acceptance of such practices provides a degree of legal 
“path dependency” that would otherwise be absent for the overwhelming 
number of voters who may consider the case without this background.  A 
second and related point is to note the concerted, strategic, and often 
successful efforts of conservative interest groups to litigate cases regarding 
the free exercise of religion.156  This context is also unique to the Court and 
is also one that is certainly beyond almost every voter. 
Finally, whatever force these factors may have had in driving the Court 
to its decision, they were reinforced by the “functional” emphasis adopted 
in the case.  As Justices Alito and Kagan noted in their concurrence, in 
determining whether an individual was properly regarded as a “minister” 
performing religious functions (and thereby an agent falling under the 
“ministerial exception” to the First Amendment), courts should analyze “the 
function performed by persons who work for religious bodies.”157  But such 
an orientation would only underscore the justice’s inclination to defer to 
religious organizations instead of involving the Justices in the exhaustive 
(and exhausting) task of judging whether a person performed identifiable 
religious activities. 
The other case that deserves a closer look is Florence, involving the 
prison strip search.158  While the public opposed the searches the Court 
ultimately sanctioned—indeed, by a wide margin (63% to 31%)—the 
Justices’ decision was a narrow 5–4 ruling.  Interestingly, public preference 
showed no partisan divergence, though the Court did.  Democrats, 
Republicans, liberals, and conservatives all heavily favored Florence.  
Coincidentally, Florence was also the only case of the five in which the 
Court’s majority deferred to the administrative expertise of the correctional 
system’s bureaucracy as a basis for their decision, not doubting how prison 
officials could most effectively accomplish their job.  In other words, the 
Court may have conceded Florence’s objections to the strip search but 
deferred to administrative demands anyway.  Moreover, the Court’s 
decision could easily have gone the other way but for the concurring 
Justices’ emphasis on the limited application of the Court’s decision.  In 
other words, the Court’s split decision—and its apparent tension with public 
opinion—is less dramatic than first meets the eye. 
The cases tested over this term and the 2010 Term posed questions 
relating to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.  In this regard, 
we note that three of the First Amendment cases (involving free speech and 
religion) brought out larger differences between the Court and public 
opinion than other cases. 
 
 156. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:  INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (2007). 
 157. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, No. 10-553, slip op. 
at 2 (U.S. Jan. 11, 2012) (Alito, J., concurring), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf. 
 158. See supra notes 49–73 and accompanying text. 
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The Court’s unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor ran contrary to the 
public’s split decision on the case, and the Court’s unanimity stood in 
contrast to the public’s partisanship.  In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association,159 a case from the 2010 Term, the public decisively favored 
allowing the state of California to regulate minors’ access to violent video 
games, but the Court, in a 7–2 decision, protected the speech of game 
makers and game sellers.160  In addition, the public broadly supported 
school choice in Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn161 
even if the school had religious affiliations, while the Court’s majority 
avoided this issue by reaching a narrow ruling on the grounds that the 
petitioners lacked standing on this question of tax policy.162 
In light of these results, we would posit that discoverable patterns in 
public opinion and Court rulings diverge by subject matter.  In other words, 
any broad statements about correlations between public opinion and Court 
rulings may need to distinguish among various constitutional provisions and 
the specific values, powers, and liberties at issue. 
IV.  EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COURT AND PUBLIC 
OPINION:  ADVANCING HYPOTHESES 
Five cases from the 2011 Term are not enough to establish clear, much 
less predictable, patterns or relationships between the public’s constitutional 
thinking and the Court’s resolution of constitutional cases.  Even combined 
with four polled cases from the 2010 Term, one can only offer the most 
tentative of hypotheses—speculation based on some of our more intriguing 
results, and a set of conjectures that certainly require more systematic 
testing. 
One hypothesis we are ready to advance is that when there are sharp 
partisan preferences among the public, these are likely to show up on the 
Court as well.  That is not to say that the opinion of the Court will reflect 
the preference of the public, but only that when public opinion seems to 
have a sharply partisan bite, we would expect a similar split to occur on the 
Court. 
We speculate that this relationship is somewhat one-sided:  in other 
words, when the Court’s vote and opinion presents an apparently partisan or 
ideological divide, we do not necessarily anticipate public opinion will 
reflect the same division.  In Jones, for example, public opinion exhibited 
little partisanship, in strong contrast with the Court’s opinion. 
 
 159. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 160. See Press Release, Farleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, U.S. Public Says 
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2011), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/vmerchants/. 
 161. 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). 
 162. Press Release, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ.’s PublicMind, Public Blesses Arizona 
Christian School Tuition 1 (Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/
taxcredits/. 
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It should be noted again that none of these polled cases were discussed 
widely in popular media or by political leaders at any level.  Voters were 
simply unaware of these cases and received no cues, direct or indirect, from 
political or opinion leaders of any kind.  Therefore, we might initially 
explain our observations about partisanship by noting the public’s lower 
degree of ideological identification and orientation than elites.  If ordinary 
voters, who tend not to think consistently in ideological and partisan 
terms,163 show evidence of this behavior for particular cases, it may be 
telling and would help us to identify an issue, case, or controversy that 
kindles such division.  Where voters show an ideological orientation, then, 
we think they are likely to serve as proverbial canaries in a coalmine, 
presaging a similar divide amongst judicial elites who are more likely to 
think (and are generally more capable of thinking) in ideological terms.  
Obviously, this is a testable claim, which we look to confirm, disconfirm, or 
qualify in future research. 
A second hypothesis we offer is that, absent a threat to national security 
or public safety, the public generally favors an expansion of individual 
rights, especially when they can identify with the individual whose rights 
are in question.  Just as people favor tax cuts for themselves and oppose tax 
increases on themselves—and just as they are generally willing to favor tax 
increases on others but not tax cuts for others—citizens typically prefer 
more rights rather than fewer when they can identify and sympathize with 
the specific identity and qualities of the rights bearer.  This observation 
does not preclude disagreement or split decisions in the electorate, as the 
public may differ as to which constitutional value choice best expands 
rights, or they may simply not sympathize or affiliate with the particular 
group or class of individuals at issue in the controversy. 
This nascent theory of “egocentric rights expansion” is corroborated by a 
number of our observations from the 2010 and 2011 Terms—including the 
public’s simultaneous unwillingness to extend constitutional protections to 
prisoners in crowded confinement (last term’s Brown v. Plata) but their 
sympathy for incoming prisoners arrested for minor offenses (Florence).  
We think more individuals can picture themselves humiliated in the context 
of a strip search occasioned by a minor offense than amongst a crowded 
cohort of inmates who need to be released.  (Indeed, in such a scenario, 
their identification is more likely to be with the members of the community 
suddenly faced with an influx of released prisoners.)164  Arguably, some of 
 
 163. See Kathleen Knight, Ideology in the 1980 Election:  Ideological Sophistication 
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Brown v. Plata, Case Involving Prison Overcrowding 2 (May 23, 2011), available at 
http://publicmind.fdu.edu/2011/brownvplata/, with Strip Searches Press Release, supra note 
14, at 2. 
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this effect can also be found in our results on race and the legal counsel 
cases.  African Americans’ higher rates of detention, arrest, and 
incarceration and greater levels of distrust toward the American criminal 
justice system may account for some of their greater willingness to insist on 
good legal advice in plea bargaining. 
This identification thesis also helps to explain why the results in several 
of these cases, such as Jones and Florence, cut across ideological lines.  
Someone who personally identifies with a defendant may set aside other 
cognitive frames, such as ideology.165  Our egocentric rights hypothesis 
also implies that the public will be more likely to support rights earlier in 
the criminal justice process, when they can identify with defendants as 
those merely accused of a crime, as opposed to convicted criminals. 
CONCLUSION 
Our polling on issues coming before the Supreme Court was driven by 
two broad objectives.  First, we wished to measure public opinion on cases 
pending before the high court until patterns or relationships of one kind or 
another can be discerned or until we can conclude that there is no 
discernible relationship between public opinion and Supreme Court 
decisions.  It is a journey of exploration, worthy of undertaking, because the 
existence and nature of the link between public opinion and government 
policy is at least as important to defining our democracy as the Court’s 
judgments. 
A second, related goal was to become more adept, accurate, and 
systematic in describing and analyzing the specific contours and content of 
popular constitutional thinking, understood as the public’s capacity for 
articulating its own judgments and voice on constitutional disputes and 
problems.  Setting aside the question of how (and whether) the public’s 
judgments shape, or are shaped by, the Court, we found it important to 
obtain a better measure of how ordinary voters approach constitutional 
questions.  The work captured in the preceding pages will help chart trends 
and changes in popular constitutionalism and obtain evidence for evaluating 
whether the public’s understanding of constitutional values and the 
application of those values is a basis for optimism or concern when it comes 
to diagnosing our civic literacy and political health. 
With two Supreme Court terms and ten cases now comprising our set of 
topics and issues, we have taken modest steps in the direction of addressing 
both of these important inquiries.  We are more confident than ever that the 
traditional standards used for evaluating the public’s constitutional 
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competence—that is, measuring their knowledge of discrete facts about the 
Court or its case law—are not only deceptive but also beside the point.  In 
contrast, polling on pending constitutional questions is an important part of 
a more sympathetic approach to assess the quality and depth of the public’s 
understanding of our constitutional law. 
